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Newly appointed as an emergency arbitrator in an international
commercial arbitration filed only three days earlier, the diligent
appointee searches the web for a best practices guideline and comes
away empty-handed, or nearly so.1 The appointee may be tempted to
invoke domestic judicial standards for the granting of provisional
relief that seem arguably relevant based on the nationalities of the
applicant and the respondent. But she will rightly follow an instinct to
be constrained by her knowledge that the law of provisional relief in
international commercial arbitration has evolved over decades as an
amalgam drawn from the practice of international courts applying
international law in state-to-state disputes, the work of international
arbitral tribunals deciding investor-state disputes under the ICSID
Convention or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the standardssetting process of the UNCITRAL itself in its revisions of its Rules
and Model Law, and the case-by-case integration of international and

1. She will find the web rather full of nuts-and-bolts summaries of emergency arbitrator
rules and procedures. See, e.g., Guillaume Lemenez & Paul Quigley, The ICDR’s Emergency
Arbitrator Procedure in Action, DISP. RESOL. J. 1-8 (2008). Recent attempts at furnishing
compact guidance for interim measures practice more generally do exist, notably the
CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS’ INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PRACTICE
GUIDELINE, APPLICATIONS FOR INTERIM MEASURES, http://www/coarb/prg/docs/
defaultsource/ciarbdocuments/guidamnce-and-ethics/practice-guidelines-protocls-andrules/international-arbitration-guidelines-2015/2015applicationinterimmeasures.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 29, 2016).
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domestic practice in the precedent-free context of commercial
arbitrations. An hour or less of web-surfing will yield multiple
references to “prima facie jurisdiction,” “prima facie case,” and
“irreparable” or (in a turn of phrase to be well noted and pondered)
“not adequately reparable” harm, but little in the way of satisfactory
texture and content for the wise application (or non-application) of
these concepts.2 A not easily surmounted difficulty for our appointee
is that the international arbitration law of provisional measures lacks a
universal lingua franca, and so terms like “prima facie” and
“irreparable” may be appreciated in materially different ways, based
on the arbitrator’s or advocate’s choice of legal culture and context. In
this short Essay, I survey some of the historical reference points for
these terms in the international law of provisional relief, with the
purpose of making the potential subtleties of meaning in these critical
phrases more apparent to the beleaguered emergency arbitrator for
whom the luxury of time for study and reflection may not exist.
I. PRIMA FACIE JURISDICTION
Although it is not addressed in any of the important providers’
rules concerning emergency arbitration, it has become widely
established that if the party against whom an emergency provisional
measure is sought raises an objection to the emergency arbitrator’s
jurisdiction by way of a prospective objection to the jurisdiction of
the not-yet-constituted arbitral tribunal over the merits of the dispute,
the emergency arbitrator may entertain the application if she is
satisfied “prima facie” that an arbitral tribunal duly constituted under
the arbitration agreement relied on by the applicant may have (or
perhaps would have) jurisdiction to hear the merits. Nothing in the
ICDR Rules3 and ICC Rules4 (to take only two prominent examples,
2. The same endeavor will yield mention of “urgency” and “necessity” with equivalent
lack of nuanced guidance. But in a paper of modest proportions, I will discuss only the three
terms mentioned in the text.
3. That is to say, the International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association (“AAA”), applied in cases administered by the AAA’s International Centre for
Dispute Resolution (“ICDR”).
4. See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION RULES
(2017),
https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/01/ICC-2017-Arbitration-and2014-Mediation-Rules-English-version.pdf (last visited April 11, 2017).
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but there are many others) clearly instructs the emergency arbitrator
to proceed in this fashion. Indeed, an initial reading of the Rules
might suggest that a more fulsome and decisive analysis of arbitral
jurisdiction is required. Thus Article 6(3) of the ICDR Rules provides
that “[t]he emergency arbitrator shall have the authority vested in the
arbitral tribunal under Article 19, including the authority to rule on
her/his own jurisdiction . . .” – and the referenced Article 19 also
includes (in Art. 19(2)) “. . . the power to determine the existence or
validity of a contract of which an arbitration clause forms a part.”
Should one read the words “rule” and “determine” to connote that the
emergency arbitrator is expected (perhaps not required) to approach
the question of arbitral jurisdiction with the same vigor and
definiteness of conclusion as she would in writing a Final Award? A
look back in time at international law jurisprudence suggests that a
very limited approach is in order.
As it happens, there is a considerable history surrounding the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to decide upon
provisional relief when the tribunal’s jurisdiction over the merits is
contested. But before we look at what “prima facie” has come to
mean in that context, it is useful to ask: On what legal basis does the
emergency arbitrator sitting in an ICC or ICDR case invoke ICJ
jurisprudence about “prima facie” jurisdiction for purposes of
provisional relief as an appropriate legal standard?
Summarizing the “test” that may be said to emerge from the ICJ
case law over five decades beginning with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
v. Iran case, Professor Rosenne states:
The concept of prima facie jurisdiction means little more than the
Court’s appreciation from the proceedings to date, that it appears
that the Court might or could have jurisdiction over the merits
and that the absence of that jurisdiction is not manifest. Although
ambiguous (and perhaps deliberately so), that is sufficient for the
Court to be able to deal with a request for provisional measures
of protection. It is a low threshold, nothing more than a
hypothesis. The Courts’ findings in provisional measures
proceedings, whatever the extent of the arguments on the matter,
are provisional. They imply no more than that the applicant has
presented an arguable case for jurisdiction over the merits,
enough for the court to be in a position to deal with the request
for provisional measures, and in due course and without
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reference to the earlier decision to decide whether it can deal
with the merits.5

Professor Rosenne makes the additional point, however, that the
principle of prima facie jurisdiction does not entail that the Tribunal
necessarily makes a less thorough analysis of the jurisdiction issue
than it would at the merits phase, but only that its examination of the
jurisdiction issue can only be as fulsome as the submissions of the
parties and the urgency of the circumstances will allow. “[T]he
Court’s prima facie jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures has
to be established from such judicial examination of the title of
jurisdiction and of the objections to it that is feasible in the short time
available within which the decision on the provisional measures has
to be made.”6
The emergency arbitrator, given her uniquely temporary role in
the commercial arbitration, and depending on the nature of the
emergency, would be well justified in applying a standard that is
much more flexible, given that the urgency itself might prevent
meaningful presentation by either party or study of the jurisdiction
question by the emergency arbitrator. Not infrequently, the
respondent will advance an objection to arbitral jurisdiction bluntly
rather than articulately, by a tactical boycott of the emergency
arbitration proceeding, and it would be questionable for the
emergency arbitrator to draw very definite adverse inference about
the merits of an objection on arbitral jurisdiction lodged in this
fashion. By taking a presumptive rather than fully analytical approach
to the question of arbitral jurisdiction in this context, the emergency
arbitrator protects the ability of the unconstituted full tribunal to
address the question of continued interim relief, while avoiding a
position of advocacy on the subject that the full tribunal might find
persuasive. Such an approach finds support in the temporary
provisional relief practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, where
Judge Charles N. Brower remarked in an oft-cited concurrence that
“the benefit of the doubt given a Claimant as to the existence of
5. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 121-22
(2005).
6. See id. at 121. Professor Rosenne further states: “The concept of PRIMA facie
jurisdiction means little more than the Court’s appreciation from the proceedings to date, that
it appears that the Court might or could have jurisdiction over the merits and that the absence
of that jurisdiction is not manifest. ... It is a low threshold, notion more than a hypothesis. The
Court’s findings [on jurisdiction] in provisional measures proceedings imply no more than that
the applicant has presented an arguable case for jurisdiction over the merits . . .” Id. at 121-22.
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jurisdiction when interim measures are considered . . . must be given
all the more where temporary restraints are sought to preserve the
Tribunal’s power to consider such interim measures.”7 In such a
context the prima facie jurisdiction question may well be limited to
asking whether (again in the words of Judge Brower) “there is a
manifest lack of jurisdiction.”8
It is a good indication of the utility of ICJ provisional relief
jurisprudence as a guide to commercial arbitration practice that the
ICJ’s declamation of this test for prima facie jurisdiction, in the 1984
Nicaragua case, resonated with the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, which,
as Professor Caron notes, quickly adopted the same prima facie test in
its own provisional measures jurisprudence.9 Surely there was natural
affinity between international jurists sitting on tribunals located in the
same place (the Hague) at the same time (the mid-1980s), presumably
taking good advantage of their proximity. But it is also instructive that
a treaty-based tribunal adjudicating rights and duties between private
US investors and the Iranian State adopted unhesitatingly the legal
standard applied by the ICJ to state-to-state controversies. Although
the basis for doing so was not fully explained, it is evident that a
principle of effectiveness was shared between the two tribunals, i.e.
that the prima facie approach to jurisdiction at the stage of temporary
provisional relief served to protect the ability of the full tribunal to
address jurisdiction anew at a subsequent stage, and the objection of
preserving the effectiveness of the full tribunal applied without
material distinction to state-to-state and investor-to-state tribunals.
The same principle of effectiveness would appear in principle to be
applicable to the relationship of the emergency arbitrator and the full
tribunal in a commercial arbitration, and so the same approach to
prima facie jurisdiction logically should be adopted.
ICSID investor-state arbitration case law on provisional relief
does not appear to have contributed materially to a more fulsome
understanding of what degree of probability that the tribunal will have
jurisdiction of the merits is sufficient for the tribunal to grant
provisional relief, the most oft-cited cases having gone not much
7. David D. Caron, Interim Measures of Protection: Theory and Practice In Light of the
Iran United States Claims Tribunal, 46 Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffenliches Recht und
Völkerrecht 465, 484 (1986) (quoting Judge Brower’s concurring opinion in Component
Builders v. Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 216 (1985)).
8. Caron, supra note 7.
9. Id. at 489-90.
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further than to declare that a respondent’s objection to jurisdiction
shall not be an obstacle to provisional relief and that a full and final
determination of jurisdiction is not a precondition to provisional
relief. Thus in Procedural Order No. 1 in the Biwater Gauff v.
Tanzania arbitration,10 the Tribunal (Born, Landau and Hanotiau)
remarked: “It is also clear, and apparently not in issue between the
parties here, that a party may be exposed to provisional measures
even though it contends that ICSID has no jurisdiction.”11 The
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators practice guideline endorsing a prima
facie approach to jurisdiction with regard to provisional relief in
commercial arbitrations (possibly the most recent “soft law”
pronouncement on the subject in the commercial arbitration realm)
makes no effort to go further in developing what is meant by prima
facie, i.e. how much hesitation about the existence of jurisdiction is
sufficient to turn the tables against provisional relief. 12
Perhaps we should not be troubled that this excavation fails to
unearth a more definite understanding of prima facie jurisdiction. If it
is universally understood in the community of emergency arbitrators,
and among the provider organizations that appoint them, that an
objection to arbitral jurisdiction is not an insurmountable obstacle and
that a comprehensive analysis of the jurisdiction objection need not be
compressed into the narrow interval for completing the emergency
arbitrator’s assignment, and that the language of arbitration rules
giving emergency arbitrators the same powers as duly constituted
arbitral tribunals to “rule” and “determine” in relation to jurisdiction
do not imply otherwise, then an important principle of emergency
10. Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22,
Procedural Order No° 1 (Mar. 31, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0087.pdf.
11. Id. at para. 70. See, as well, an ICSID Tribunal’s decision on provisional relief in
PNG Sustainable Development Program, Ltd. v. Independent State of Papua New Guinea,
ICSID Case No. ARB/13/33, Decision on Claimant’s Request for Provisional Measures,
para.118-19 (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw4108.pdf,, where the Tribunal observes that it generally will not suffice for an ICSID
Tribunal to rely for prima facie purposes on the fact that the ICSID Secretariat regarded the
Claimant’s assertion of jurisdiction as sufficient for the case to be registered. But the Tribunal
stopped short of an indication of how much more rigor is in order: “The determination of the
prima facie jurisdiction for provisional measures is a somewhat higher threshold than that to
be applied at the registration stage, although it of course also falls short of a final decision on
jurisdiction.” At a later point in this Decision the Tribunal referred to the requirements of
prima facie jurisdiction and prima facie case on the merits as “relatively undemanding.” Id. at
para. 125.
12. See CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS, supra note 1, at 6.
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arbitration “common law” will be very helpfully in place. And
perhaps it is a desirable feature of this common law that the level of
probability that jurisdiction may ultimately be found to exist, to
constitute the required prima facie showing, should be variable and
not fixed, taking into account the practical possibility of in-depth
analysis of the jurisdiction issue presented, the intrusiveness and
burden of the provisional measure proposed, and the ability of the
applicant to provide assurance of compensation in case it turns out the
measure was not justified.
II. IRREPARABLE?, NOT ADEQUATELY REPARABLE?, OR
SUBSTANTIAL? HARM
Should we be surprised, or merely distressed, that at such a
relatively mature stage of the development of the international law of
arbitral provisional relief, a concept as fundamental to the application
of that law as “irreparable harm” lacks a well-settled universal
meaning, and that this situation is explained, in large measure, by a
seemingly perpetual impasse in the development of the law on a
critical question: what law furnishes the standards applicable to the
exercise of arbitral power to provide provisional relief? Further, shall
we be distraught, or merely distressed, that emergency arbitrators in
international cases, not specifically vetted by the appointing provider
organizations for their immersion in these arcane points of arbitral
provisional relief law, may more or less reflexively apply provisional
relief standards that are most familiar to them from domestic judicial
practice in the nation whose substantive law governs the contract? In
the United States, where former domestic judges are admired as
potential international arbitrators (by parties and providers alike) for
their perceived prudence, fairness, and immersion in substantive
principles of contracts, this problem is acute, and any arbitration
practitioner who has advanced the position that international
standards for provisional relief should apply in a New York-seated
arbitration under a contract providing for application of New York
law, to a tribunal composed of such judges, will attend to the
enormity of the obstacle to be overcome.
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Our perpetual predicament was well summarized recently by a
prominent arbitration practitioner in Finland, based upon wellresearched consultation of international sources:13
There is a general consensus among legal academics that the law
governing the arbitrators’ power to order interim measures is the
lex arbitri. In contrast, different views have been expressed as to
which law should provide the standards for a tribunal’s decision
whether to accept, or reject, a request for provisional measures.
Three principal choices seem possible for the law governing the
standards for arbitrator-ordered interim relief: (1) the lex arbitri;
(2) the law governing the parties’ underlying contract (lex
causae), or (3) international standards.
As Born convincingly submits, there is little reason to conclude
that lex arbitri provides the substantive standards for an arbitral
tribunal’s decision whether to issue provisional measures. This is
so already for the reason that no national arbitration statute (other
than the 2006 revisions to the Model Law) provides meaningful
standards governing an arbitral tribunal’s decision whether the
order interim measures. Secondly, it seems equally insupportable
to contend that lex causae provides the standards for granting
arbitral interim relief: the fact that the parties have subjected their
contract under a particular substantive law provides little, if any,
indication as to their intentions regarding the granting of
provisional measures. It follows that international sources – and
not any national system of law, or decisions of national courts –
should provide the standards for the grant of interim measures in
international arbitration. The problem, however, is that there is
no settled body of jurisprudence on this topic yet. On the
contrary, the relevant standards are still evolving.14

The question of whether “international standards” apply is
obviously closely linked to the question of “irreparable harm,”
because that term has a rather definite meaning in common law
countries. Yet it would be folly to assume that something other than
“irreparable harm” in the common law sense is necessarily the
applicable international standard, as the gravitational pull of common
law concepts into international arbitration has followed from the
ascendance of common law lawyers in the field. This conundrum
having failed to be sorted out by the best and brightest minds in the
13. Mika Savola, Interim Measures and Emergency Arbitrator Proceedings, 23 CROAT.
ARB. Y.B. 73, at 81–2 (2016) (citations omitted).
14. Id.
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field over several decades, I do not hope to solve it here. But a brief
historical tour may offer emergency arbitrators some context.
Thirty-five years ago15 upon the completion of the very first
ICSID arbitration (a case that also entailed the first confrontation of
an ICSID Tribunal with an application for provisional relief),
Professor Lalive, in writing a memoir of his involvement as an
advocate in that case, remarked that in the matter of provisional relief,
“[a] large measure of discretion is granted here, as usual, to the
arbitration tribunal, who will naturally be inclined, when exercising it,
to follow the principles developed in international cases.”16 The large
measure of discretion resulted from the decision of the drafters of the
ICSID Convention to refrain from incorporating into Article 47
thereof, concerning the power to grant provisional relief, a set of
standards for the granting of such relief to be uniformly applied.17 But
it was not quite as inevitable as Professor Lalive would have willed us
to believe that ICSID Tribunals would “naturally be inclined” to
apply international standards. A decent respect for the legal traditions
of the investor’s home State and the domestic law of the respondent
State might have called for some infusion of such principles into the
proceedings. But if an attempt to do so might force a choice between
opposed legal standards, each commanding equal claim to
applicability, was not the reasonable choice to resort to an
international standard? Perhaps what Professor Lalive had in mind as
15. Historical evidence as to whether international tribunals tended to prefer civil law
over common law in their early confrontations with interim relief has been found to be
inconclusive. In a deeply-researched work on the history of provisional relief in international
tribunals, Cameron Miles concludes that the practice of international courts and tribunals in the
first half of the 20th Century seems to have drawn somewhat more on civilian rather than
common law notions of interim relief in municipal legal systems but that no clear conclusions
can be drawn: “[I]t may be tentatively inferred that international courts and tribunals in the
early 20th Century drew on the civilian model of provisional relief in preference to the
common law tradition of the interlocutory injunction, but anything more than this is mere
speculation. Although a close connection between domestic and international concepts of
interim relief might be suggested, the evidence required for a more specific and emphatic
assertion is at present lacking.” Cameron A. Miles, The Origins of the Law of Provisional
Measures Before International Courts and Tribunals, 73 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 615, 672
(2013).
16. Pierre Lalive, The First ‘World Bank’ Arbitration (Holiday Inns v. Morocco)—Some
Legal Problems, 51 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 123, 133 (1980).
17. Article 47 provides, as it did at its inception, that “[e]xcept as the parties otherwise
agree, the Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, recommend any
provisional measures which should be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.”
ICSID, ICSID CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN
STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES, art. 47.
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“natural” was this seemingly inevitable quest for a neutral set of
principles whose adoption would not only serve the cause of equality
of the Investor and State parties in a given case, but would also
initiate the development of a jurisprudence constante of arbitral
provisional measures.
Cycle forward five years, to 1986, and the Iran-US Claims
Tribunal only five years into its lifetime had already experienced
more than several dozen applications for provisional relief governed
by its Rules adapted substantially without changes from the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976. Professor Caron, as he then
was,18 commenting on this jurisprudence, sounded a theme that still
resonates and still challenges commercial arbitration tribunals: the
relative status of municipal procedural law and customary
international law when dealing concretely with an application for
provisional relief. He noted that the absence of detail in Article 26 of
the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules19 concerning the provisional measures
standards to be applied by tribunals presented the Iran-US Claims
Tribunal with a clear choice, and that this choice was made decisively
in favor of international standards:
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal consistently filled gaps
in its procedural rules by reference to customary international
arbitral practice and not, for example, by reference to Dutch law.
This choice is the only means by which the UNCITRAL Rules
will develop in a uniform fashion, and come to be a predictable
and desired part of the international dispute settlement process.
Indeed, such practice promotes the development not only of the
UNCITRAL Rules, but also of a customary international arbitral
procedure generally, whether such arbitration be public or
private.20

An early (in relative terms) exponent of caution in adopting the
common law notion of irreparable harm into an international
customary principle governing arbitral provisional relief, Professor
18. As of December 2, 2015, Professor Caron was appointed to replace Judge Charles
Brower as a member of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. See IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
http://www.iusct.net (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
19. Article 26 as it then was provided: “At the request of either party, the arbitral tribunal
may take any interim measures it deems necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the
dispute, including measures for the conservation of the goods forming the subject-matter in
dispute, such as ordering their deposit with a third person or the sale of perishable goods.”
G.A. Res. 31/98, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Dec. 15, 1976).
20. Caron, supra note 7, at 472.
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Caron in his 1986 survey (1) noted a mixed record of embrace and
reluctance in the jurisprudence of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal; (2)
took note of the risk of oversimplification of the common law concept
of irreparable harm (non-compensability by an award of money) in its
adoption into international jurisprudence, which might overlook more
nuanced aspects of the common law (such as the exception for money
damages not easily or precisely measured) that cause injury to be seen
as irreparable despite the possibility of a monetary award; (3)
cautioned that assumptions about effective enforcement and execution
of monetary judgments in common law courts may be inapplicable to
international arbitral awards; and (4) maintained that an inflexible
insistence that provisional relief may only be issued if the injury is not
compensable by money might often be at odds with the fundamental
purpose of arbitral provisional relief to preserve the rights of the
parties up to the time of a final award.21
Foreshadowing later developments in jurisprudence and in
UNCITRAL’s own texts, Professor Caron observed:
But if not irreparable prejudice, what circumstances are required
by Art. 26 for the granting of interim measures? If the purpose of
the measures is to conserve the respective rights in the dispute
alleged by the parties, then all that should be required is an act
prejudicing such rights. Given that interim measures proceedings
are costly and often delay the adjudication of a claim, it is
appropriate the such prejudice also be substantial. A substantial
prejudice approach is appropriate given that an act prejudicial to
a right should not be characterized as being acceptable simply
because damages are available. The approach makes sense
commercially given that the disruption to business relations and
the waste resulting from such acts cannot truly be compensated
by damages.22

Cycle forward now 20 years to the adoption by UNCITRAL in
2006 of an amendment to the Model Law in regard to provisional
measures by arbitral tribunals, to require that the applicant should
satisfy the arbitral tribunal inter alia that “[h]arm not adequately
reparable by an award of damages is likely to result if the measure is
not ordered . . . .”23 The emergency arbitrator not already immersed in
21. Caron, supra note 7, at 492–93.
22. Id. at 493-94.
23. U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration 1985: with amendments as adopted in 2006, Art.
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the relevant history and compelled by the circumstances of the
assignment to rely largely on instinct and experience could readily
infer that the intention was to capture in its essence that common law
concept of irreparable injury, and regard the difference in phrasing as
a nuance not worthy of exploration. This would be unfortunate. An
excavation into the UNCITRAL Working Group labors that resulted
after several years in the 2006 version of Article 17A would yield the
conclusion that the phrasing “not adequately reparable” was a pushback against the common law concept of irreparable injury as
advocated by common law participants in the amendment process,
notably the United States delegation. Delving as far back in time as
UNCITRAL’s website will permit, we find that in 2000 the concept
of elaborating standards for the granting of provisional relief in the
Model Law was more or less launched with reference to a report by
the International Law Association entitled “Provisional and Protective
Measures in International Litigation” that made no reference to
irreparable harm as a criterion for the granting of relief, but
mentioned only the requirement of a plausible case on the merits and
that the injury to plaintiff from denial of relief outweigh the harm to
defendant from granting relief. 24 By 2002, a draft emerged that would
have required the applicant to demonstrate likely “irreparable
harm.”25 But in 2004 there was resistance to that term within the
UNCITRAL Working Group on a number of grounds; efforts by
common law proponents to rephrase to more precisely capture the
meaning of irreparable harm in common law jurisprudence did not
find favor, and the rephrasing “harm not adequately reparable by an
award of damages” was installed as a expansionary replacement for—
not as a close proxy for—irreparable harm. On this matter it is
worthwhile to quote the Working Group’s 2004 report in full text, as
it is legislative history that emergency arbitrators and especially those
from common law backgrounds should have engrained on their
17A(1)(a), U.N. Doc. A/40/17, annex I & A/61/17, annex I, https://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2017).
24. U.N. Secretary-General, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Possible uniform rules
on certain issues concerning settlement of commercial disputes, ¶ 108, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108 (Jan. 14, 2000), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/
V00/501/85/PDF/V0050185.pdf (last visited January 5, 2017).
25. Working Group on Arbitration, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the
work of its thirty-sixth session, ¶ 58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/508 (Apr. 12, 2002),
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V02/533/86/PDF/V0253386.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 6, 2017).
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memories when their attention is directed to the “not adequately
reparable” language in Article 17A of the Model Law:
88. In addition to the concerns expressed above [re lack of
universal understanding of the meaning of “irreparable harm”], it
was stated that, if the Model Law was to provide that interim
measures of protection could be granted only to avoid harm that
could not be compensated in monetary terms, there would be a
risk that the provision would be interpreted in a very restrictive
manner. As a result, interim measures in arbitration might be
more difficult to obtain than similar measures in court
proceedings, while parties seeking enforcement of such interim
measures, would still need to engage in additional proceedings
before the competent court. The question was raised as to
whether it was the intention of the Working Group to adopt such
a restrictive approach as to potentially exclude from the field of
interim measures any loss that might be cured by an award of
damages. It was also stated that, in current practice, it was not
uncommon for an arbitral tribunal to issue an interim measure
merely in circumstances where it would be comparatively
complicated to compensate the harm with an award of damages.
89. With a view to providing a more flexible criterion, another
proposal was made to replace the words “irreparable harm” by
the words: “harm not adequately reparable by an award of
damages”. It was stated that that proposal addressed the concerns
that irreparable harm might present too high a threshold and
would more clearly establish the discretion of the arbitral tribunal
in deciding upon the issuance of an interim measure. The
Working Group found that proposal generally acceptable.26

This evidently is the most significant piece of drafting history of
Article 17A of the Model Law, showing the effective rejection, as too
restrictive, of the US common law notion of irreparable harm as the
quid pro quo for arbitral provisional relief.27 And as a contemporary
indication of the appreciation for that broader international standard,
we can see today the new emergency arbitration rule in the JAMS
International Arbitration Rules that became effective on September 1,
26. Working Group on Arbitration, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the
work of its fortieth session, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/547 (April 16, 2004), https://documentsdds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V04/521/51/PDF/V0452151.pdf (last visited January 6,
2017).
27. The Model Law’s “not adequately reparable” formulation in Article 17A was
adopted in haec verba into Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in the amendments
of those Rules effective in 2010.
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2016, wherein Article 3 concerning emergency provisional relief
provides in Article 3.3 that the emergency arbitrator “shall determine
whether the party seeking emergency relief has shown that immediate
loss or damage will result in the absence of emergency relief and
whether the requesting party is entitled to such relief” (emphasis
supplied).28 The reluctance of arbitrators to be limited to a strict
common law non-compensability notion of irreparable harm has also
been seen in recent ICSID arbitration case law.29
The foregoing should not be taken to suggest that the
terminology of “irreparable harm” or its common law origins are in
the process of becoming extinct from international provisional relief
jurisprudence. But even where the term continues to be used, the
reader must be cautious to assess whether a given tribunal intends to
use it in its restrictive common law sense, or in the broader more
flexible sense that contemporary jurisprudence and codifications
support. The emergency arbitrator who is “on the clock” and in quest

28. As some further connective tissue, I note that the drafter of the JAMS 2016 Rules
served as an arbitrator in 2014 case in which this author, as an advocate, applied for
provisional relief and urged the Model Law Article 17A standard as the proper standard for
international cases against the position of the adverse party that in a New York seated
international arbitration governed by New York law, the New York judicial common law
standard should control.
29. Commentators Mouawad and Silbert, reviewing the ICSID investment arbitrator case
law on provisional measures, find that the notion of irreparable harm as found in the common
law jurisprudence of interlocutory injunctions is not a necessary element for provisional relief
in investment arbitration, being supplanted instead by a more flexible concept of substantial or
not adequately reparable harm that might in some circumstances include harm that could be
redressed by an award of money damages: “[T]hese concepts of ‘substantial’ or ‘irreparable’
harm are flexible under international law, and ‘[do] not necessarily require that the injury
complained of not be remediable by an award of damages.’ Substantial harm may exist even if
the party would still have recourse in damages.” Caline Mouawad & Elizabeth Silbert, A
Guide to Interim Measures in Investor-State Arbitration, 29(3) ARB. INT’L 381, 393 (2013).
Writing even more recently about the ICSID caselaw and also non-ICSID investment
arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Luttrell also reports upon a divergence in
the case law, with one group of decisions (and arbitrators) embracing a concept of irreparable
harm closely akin to the common law concept of insufficiency of money damages, and another
accepting that the harm should be either irreparable or substantial—the latter apparently for
injury that a monetary award could address but in such an imprecise way that there would be
large risk that even a large sum of money would not be a fair substitute for the property or
right or investment itself. See Sam Luttrell, ICSID Provisional Measures ‘In the Round’, 31
ARB. INT’L 393, 403-06 (2015).
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of clarity might reasonable rely on this formulation by an ICSID
Tribunal chaired by Professor Born in the Papua New Guinea case:30
[T]he party requesting provisional measures must demonstrate
that, if the requested measures are not granted, there is a material
risk of serious or irreparable injury. There are variations in
approach or the precise wording used by the ICSID tribunals as
to whether this requirement is that of “irreparable” harm, or
whether a demonstration of “serious” harm will suffice. In the
Tribunal’s view, the term “irreparable” harm is properly
understood as requiring a showing of a material risk of serious or
grave damage to the requesting party, and not a harm that is
literally “irreparable” in what is sometimes regarded as the
narrow common law sense of the term. The degree of “gravity”
or “seriousness” of harm that is necessary for an order of
provisional relief cannot be specified with precision, and depends
in part on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the relief
requested and the relative harm to be suffered by each party;
suffice it to say that substantial, serious harm, even if not
irreparable, is generally sufficient to satisfy this element of the
standard for granting provisional measures.31

III. PRIMA FACIE CASE ON THE MERITS
It is perhaps in regard to the strength of the applicant’s case on
the merits—as must be demonstrated as a prerequisite for the
obtaining of provisional relief—that there is the largest chasm
between the approach of common law courts and the international
customary standard. It is a matter of different normative priorities,
and the leap from judicial culture to arbitral culture ought not to be a
large one if emergency arbitrators coming from judicial backgrounds
take instruction in the differences. In the common law courts,
provisional relief prototypically in the form of a preliminary
injunction historically has been a temporally-limited subset of the
permanent final relief sought by the applicant and so the courts
naturally have been concerned to receive a substantial showing of
likely success before moving the relief needle in the plaintiff’s favor
30. PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd. v. Independent State of Papua New
Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/33, Award, ¶ 109 (May 5, 2015).
31. This formulation was cited by an applicant for emergency relief and embraced by the
emergency arbitrator in Kompozit LLC v. Republic of Moldova, Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce Arbitration No. 2016/095, Emergency Award on Interim Measures, ¶ 86-88 (June
14, 2016).
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upon a less than complete legal and factual record. At an opposite
extreme, in international courts addressing state-to-state disputes, and
especially in the years before provisional measures issued by such
courts were clearly considered to be binding, the focal point of
provisional relief was on non-aggravation of the dispute by unilateral
action of one of the State parties, and considerations of respect for the
positions of the respective sovereigns weighed heavily against any
premature position-taking concerning the merits of the dispute. 32
Professor Kaufman-Kohler posits that there is now a “clear
transnational standard” of “possibility of success on the merits” and
explains the transnational retreat from the common law judicial norm:
[T]raditionally…this requirement is framed as the likelihood that
the applicant will prevail on the merits. However, arbitral
tribunals are reluctant to venture an assessment of the merits at
an often early stage of the proceedings when the record is still
scarce; they are concerned about prejudging and giving the
impression that they have lost their objectivity. As a result, they
soften the traditional requirement and tend to be satisfied with a
showing that the claim is not manifestly without merit.33

The notion that the international standard is a conscious
“softening” of the common law standard may also be traced into the
deliberations of the UNCITRAL Working Group concerning Article
17 A of the Model Law. For example, in a US delegation position
paper in 2004 concerning ex parte interim measures, it was observed
that the risk of prejudgment of the merits was a concern that exists
with regard to all interim measures and not only those sought ex
parte, and that “[t]he Working Group has responded to that concern
by softening some of the conditions for interim measures precisely to
forestall this risk of prejudgment. For example, the present draft of
32. Professor Caron commented on mainly ICJ practice 30 years ago. See Caron, supra
note 7, at 490-91 (“Although the likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim is
required for injunctive relief in many municipal systems, it rarely is articulated in public
international arbitration as a factor to be considered in the granting of interim measures. It is a
factor nonetheless, albeit sotto voce. It certainly is appropriate that when a case manifestly
lacks merit, necessarily costly and disruptive interim measures to protect such dubious rights
should not be granted. A tribunal must determine prima facie not only whether it possesses
jurisdiction but also whether the question presented by the case is frivolous. The reluctance of
tribunals to openly voice their consideration of this factor probably reflects in large part a
desire to avoid embarrassment to a sovereign state party to the arbitration or accusations of
pre-judging the case.”).
33. GABRIELLE KAUFMAN-KOHLER & ANTONIO RIGOZZI, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN SWITZERLAND 343-44 (2015).
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revised Article 17 provides that the tribunal need only be satisfied that
‘there is a reasonable possibility that the requesting party will
succeed on the merits’ before issuing any interim measure.” 34 It is
notable, however, that in some arbitral provisional relief contexts the
merits of the case are nearly irrelevant, and perhaps the foremost
example of this is when a party collaterally attacks the arbitral process
by pursuing proceedings in another forum. This is perhaps more
common in investor-state arbitration, where a sovereign may take
criminal or other proceedings against the investor in its own courts.35
But it is equally possible that a state- or non-state respondent in an
international commercial arbitration will take proceedings against the
claimant in another forum and that the request for arbitral provisional
relief might take the form of a request for an arbitral anti-suit
injunction. The “merits” issue, in such context, is not so much
whether the claimant should prevail ultimately on its claimed
substantive rights, but whether claimant is correct in asserting the
exclusivity of the arbitral tribunal to address those rights and whether
claimant is correct that the same rights are threatened to be
adjudicated in, or impacted by proceedings in, a different and
improper forum.36
We may therefore understand “reasonable possibility of success”
to have at least two dimensions. One concerns the degree of strength
of the claim to ultimate final relief as a legal and factual matter – a
softened approach to the common law probability of success
requirement. This dimension of “reasonable possibility” is in play
when (paradigmatically, but not only when) the requested provisional
relief concerns the commercial relations of the parties during the
arbitration. A second consideration is whether the interim measure
requested is more related to the integrity of the arbitral process than it
is to the interim status of business relations between the parties: when
34. James Castello, Ex Parte Interim Measures of Relief: Summary of the Position of the
U.S. Delegation at the Meeting of the UNCITRAL Working Group, New York, February 23-27,
2004, https://www.state.gov/s/l/2004/78113.htm (last visited January 9, 2017).
35. See, e.g., Roberto Aguirre Luzi & Ginny Castelan, International Energy
Arbitrations, Criminal Proceedings and Provisional Measures, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Oct. 2,
2015), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/chapter/1036054/international-energy-arbitrationscriminal-proceedings-and-provisional-measures.
36. See Savola, supra note 13, at 11 (“[S]ome provisional measures typically require
strong showings of serious injury, urgency and prima facie case (e.g., maintaining or restoring
the status quo, or ordering performance of a contract or other legal obligation), while other
provisional measures are unlikely to demand the same showing (e.g. preservation of evidence,
or enforcement of confidentiality obligations).”).
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the interim measure sought concerns preservation of evidence or
proceedings in another forum, a lesser concern with the ultimate
merits is reasonable because there is a smaller risk that the interim
measure might impair the respondent’s substantive rights if the
respondent turns out to be the winner.
At least one other dimension of “reasonable possibility” is
significant for the emergency arbitrator in a way that is distinct for
that role. The full tribunal once constituted may promptly undo any
relief granted by the emergency arbitrator, and can take such action
on a more fulsome evidentiary record. The emergency arbitrator,
having only a very temporary status, is not so much concerned with
prejudging the merits as with having a disproportionate formative
influence on the full tribunal’s view of the merits. Respect for the
ability of the arbitral tribunal to remain objective should dictate that
the emergency arbitrator consider the merits only enough to satisfy
herself that relief is not being enlisted in service of a vexatious claim.
“Minimally reasonable” would therefore seem to be the correct
guidepost for the emergency arbitrator in most circumstances.
Perhaps the argument could be made that the emergency
arbitrator, having a temporary mandate only and no eventual role in
the arbitral tribunal that will issue the final award, need not be overly
concerned with her continuing objectivity or the parties’ perceptions
of it, and therefore might justifiably require a more substantial
demonstration of a strong merits case as a condition of emergency
relief. But the argument would seem to be unpersuasive, as the
temporary nature of the emergency arbitrator’s mandate and the entire
reversibility of her determinations by the full arbitral tribunal once
constituted militate in favor of the emergency arbitrator having the
most minimal involvement with the merits of the case that the
circumstances will permit. The mission of the emergency arbitrator is
essentially to provide only so much temporary relief as is necessary to
maintain the effective ability of the full arbitral tribunal to address
continued provisional relief once it is constituted. And the provider
organizations, in establishing the emergency arbitrator role, were
mindful that in the US and other common law judicial systems,
judicial provisional relief in aid of arbitration brings into play the
judicial interlocutory injunction standard of likelihood of success on
the merits: a standard that with its related extensive evidence-taking
procedures is antithetical to the early stages of an international arbitral
process.
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CONCLUSION
Of course, under emergency arbitrator rules of many arbitral
institutions, there is no strict necessity that the emergency arbitrator
should invoke any of these well-developed notions of prima facie
jurisdiction, irreparable or in adequately reparable or at least very
substantial harm, and perhaps a good arguable case. Only where the
UNCITRAL Model Law or provisions comparable to its Article 17A
are in force as the lex arbitri at the arbitral seat may these
requirements be considered as binding the decision-making of the
emergency arbitrator. These rules designed to maximize flexibility
avoid articulating standards and by this omission entrust the
emergency arbitration with wide discretion to embrace or ignore,
consciously or otherwise, decades of development of international
law concerning the availability of provisional relief in international
disputes. And so, as our colleague Anibal Sabater has pointed out, the
extent to which these recognized criteria will be applied, explicitly or
otherwise, in a particular emergency arbitration setting will vary with
the urgency, the profile of the arbitrator, the briefing of issues by the
parties, and the nature of the emergency relief sought—with possibly
more attention to the jurisprudence of standards and criteria when the
applicant seeks affirmative relief than when the applicant seeks to
preserve the status quo and simply to direct that the respondent take
no steps to alter the status quo.37
The quality and predictability of the process will be enhanced,
however, if emergency arbitrators in international cases come to their
task armed with some historical context. The modest effort of this
Essay has been to provide a resource for such use.

37. See Anibal Sabater (as panelist in), Emergency Arbitrator Proceedings in Oil & Gas
Disputes (panel discussion at 2016 3rd Annual ITA-IEL-ICC Joint Conference on
International Energy Arbitration). Juris Publishing, Emergency Arbitrator Proceedings in Oil
& Gas Disputes, 10(2) WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 207, 222-24 (Andrea K. Bjorklund
& R. Doak Bishop eds., 2016).
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